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PROFESSIONAL M1SCONDUCT.-THE CASE OF MR. BRADLEY
AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
ALTERCATIONS between judges and counsel in the conduct of
a cause so rarely get beyond a momentary disturbance of the
regularity of proceedings, except in petty .tribunals, having no
proper professional character either in their judges or their bar,
that they may be best allowed to pass quietly into oblivion with
the close of the day. But the case of Mr. Bradley and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has had such prominence
given it by the nature of the trial in which the dispute first arose,
and the unfortunate habit of the newspapers to call the court
"the Supreme Court at Washington," that it is hardly proper to
pass it by without some notice in a professional journal.
The facts seem to have been as follows:On the 2d of July, 1867, during the trial of the case of The
United ,tates v. John ff. Surratt, in the Criminal Court of the
District of Columbia, just after the adjournment of the court for the
day, a difficulty occurred between the Presiding Judge, FISHER, and
Joseph H. Bradley, Sr., the prisoner's counsel. The judge's account is, that as he was descending from the bench, Mr. Bradley
accosted him in a rude and insulting manner, charging the judge
with having offered him a series of insults from the bench from
the commencement of the trial. The judge disclaimed any intention to insult, and assured Mr. Bradley that lie entertained no
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feelings towards him but those of respect.

Mr. Bradley, instead

of accepting this explanation, or disclaimer, thereupon thr'eatened
the judge with personal chastisement.
Mr. Bradley's account differs very materially. He says that
the court had not only been adjourned, but that the people had
left the room, and Judge FISHER himself had gone out, but came
back again for his umbrella, and, as he passed Bradley, the latter
said, "Judge, what do you mean by treating me as you have done
to-day ?" The judge replied, in great excitement, shaking his
finger insultingly in Bradley's fac6, and, after some altercation,
the judge said, "Step out with me, step out, if you dare."
Whereupon Bradley stepped towards him, but was seized by some
members of the bar and held, and the judge, holding his clinched
hand towards Bradley, said, "You know where to find me-I am
responsible, in every form, for whatever I say or do," &c., with
other abusive language.
With two such different versions before us, neither supported
by the testimony of any but the interested and excited parties, it
is impossible to form an opinion on the real facts as to the original
aggressor, and in a question of insult, where manner and the relations of the parties are everything, it is, perhaps, impossible to do
more than assume the safe general proposition that both were in
the wrong.
The subsequent facts are sufficiently certain. On the conclusion of the trial, August 10th, Judge FISHER made an order
reciting his version of the case as above given, and concluding
with striking Mr. Bradley's name from the list of attorneys of
this court. These words, as will be seen, subsequently became
important.
Immediately on the announcement of the foregoing order, Mr.
Bradley addressed the judge, saying, "Has the court adjourned
yet?"
Judge FISHER.-" No, sir."
Mr. Bradley.-" Then, before it does adjourn, I desire to say,
in the presence of this audience, that the statement you have read
isutterly false, from beginning to end."
On the same day, August 10th, immediately after the adjournment, Mr. Bradley followed Judge FISHER into a street car, and
handed him the following note:-

OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
" WASHINGTOiN, August 6th 1867.
"How. GEORGE P. FIsIER:" Sir: In the altercation which occurred between us when you returned to the
court-room after the adjournment on the 2d of July last, you observed that you
were sick, and were then pleased to add ' You know where to find me; and I hold
myself responsible in every form for whatever I say or do,' or words to that effect,
after which you applied to me most opprobrious epithets. There is but one interpretation of such an intimation received among gentlemen. I told you I could
wait; and am gratified to find that you have recovered, and that the trial of the
then pending case being now closed, we aiZ both at liberty.
"'That no time may be unnecessarily lost, I beg you will let me know, as soon
as you conveniently can, when it will suit you to meet me out of this District, that
we may arrange, to our mutual satisfaction, the points of difference between us
without incurring the risk and odium which might accompany any controversy
here, or in public.
1W ith the same view I hand you this note in person, and am, sir, your most
obedient servant,
"Jos. H. BRADLEY."

So far the matter had been confined to the Criminal Court, in
which Judge FISHER was then presiding. The Criminal Court,
however, is held in turn by the judges of the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia. The courts of the District of Columbia were organized in their present form by the Act of Congress
of March 3d, 1863, which created a Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and provided for District and Criminal Courts
to be held from time to time by one of the justices of the Supreme
Court of the district.
The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, considering
the Criminal Court- as a mere branch of itself, on October 21st,
1867, entered a rule on Mr. Bradley, reciting the facts of the
original quarrel as set forth by Judge FISHER, the order of Judge
FISrER in the Criminal Court, the remarks of Mr. Bradley on the
announcement of the order of August 10th, and the challenge,
and calling upon him "to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of this court, by reason of said offensive conduct -and language towards one of its members, and relating to
the official acts of the said justice."
Mr. Bradley filed an answer to this rule, setting forth his version of the facts as already given, and objecting that the order
of Judge FISHER having been made for an alleged contempt
without notice to him, Bradley, was void both at common law and
under the statute of March 2d, 1831 (4 Stat. 487), and that therefore when Judge FIsHER made his statement and announced the
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order, the whole proceeding was extrajudicial, and the mere assertion of an individual,which ie,Bi'adley, was authorized to contradict and deny in any manner he thought fit, and hence he could
not be held guilty of a contempt in using the language he did on
August 10th. He further argued that it was not technically a
contempt. In regard to the letter dated August 6th, he argued
that it was not a challenge, nor meant for such, but merely a letter
to open the way for an amicable settlement of a private controversy, and that to remove any doubt on this subject he had withdrawn the letter before any action had been taken by the court in
regard to this matter.
* This answer was sworn to and filed November 4th, 1867, and
Mr. Bradley having been heard in support of it, the court, on
November 9th, 1867, ordered that "for the causes set forth in
said rule," Mr. Bradley's name be stricken from the rolls of the
court.
On March 13th, 1868, Mr. Bradley filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the United States for a mandamus to the Judges
of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, commanding
them to restore him to the rolls. The court awarded an alternative mandamus, returnable to December, 1868.
On December 5th, 1868, the Judges of the Supreme Court of
the District filed a return to the mandamus. The return sets
forth quite argumentatively and in detail, 1st, that Bradley was
removed from his office of attorney after due notice and hearing
him in his defence, and that the order was a judgment of the
court on a subject within its exclusive jurisdiction, and not subject to review by any other court; 2, the contempt committed
on August 10th, in open court; 3, that the Criminal Court is
merely a session of the Supreme Court of the district, and therefore a contempt of the former was a contempt of the latter; 4,
that the conduct of Mr. Bradley was such a misbehavior in his
office of attorney, that it gave the court jurisdiction to disbar
him independent of the doctrine of contempt.
The mandamus was argued on December 18th, 1868, by Hon.
P. Phillips for Bradley. The court relied on its return, and was
not represented by counsel.
Mr. Phillips confined his argument to the questions of jurisdiction, maintaining that the Criminal Court and the Supreme Court
of the district were separate courts, and the latter had no juris-
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diction to disbar for a contempt committed in the former; and
that mandamus was the, proper remedy.
The Supreme Court of the United States awarded a peremptory mandamus to restore Mr. Bradley, and held1. That the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, as
organized by the Act of Congress of 3d March, 1863, is a different court from the Criminal Court as fixed by the same act,
though the latter court is held by a judge of the former. Hence,
the former court has no power to disbar an attorney for a contempt of the latter.
2. An attorney cannot be disbarred for misbehavior in his office
of attorney generally, upon the return of a rule issued against
him for contempt of court, and without opportunity of defence
to, or explanation of, the first-named charge.
3. Mandamus lies from the Supreme Court of the United States
to an inferior Court of the United States, to restore an attorney
at law disbarred by the latter court, when it had no jurisdiction
in the matter; as ex. gr. for a contempt committed in another
court.
On the last point MILLER, J., dissented.
The law, as laid down by a decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States, made after argument, and almost with unanimity, it would not become us to criticize, were we so inclined,
but we may say, with all respect, that this decidion rests upon
very strict technical constructions, and that the court were almost
exceptionally astute in discovering grounds for their jurisdiction.
By the Act of Congress of March 2d, 1831 (4 Stat. 487,
Brightly's Dig., tit. Contempt), the power of courts of the United
States to punish summarily for contempts, shall not extend "to
any cases except the misbehavior of any person or persons in the
presence of said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of the officers of said
courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any officer of said courts, party, juror, witness, or any
other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command of the said courts."
The second section provides for the punishment by indictment,
of certain other acts which were contempts at common law. This
act, as is noted by Ar. Phillips in his argument, was introduced
by Mr. Buchanan, one of the managers of the impeachment of
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Judge PECK, before the Senate of the United States, immediately
after the termination of that trial. It unquestionably limits the
power of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to punish for contempts to those cases included in the act. Were it not
for this, the delivery of the letter of August 6th to Judge FISHER
by Mr. Bradley, would certainly have been a contempt of the
Supreme Court, for while sitting in the car in the street, Judge
FISHER was as much a judge of the one court as of the other,
and there can be no question that a challenge to a judge at any
time, or in any place, is a gross contempt of the court of which
he is a member. With the first point of the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, therefore, we are not entitled
to find fault, though with so grave a consequence of this statute
before them, it might have been worth while to inquire very
rigidly if the conduct of Mr. Bradley were not within the meaning of the act.
The Supreme Court of the District, therefore, having no jurisdiction of Mr. Bradley's case on the ground of contempt, fell
back on their general authority over the behavior of their attorneys (ground 4, return to the mandamus, ante, p. 132), a substantial ground upon which they might have rested securely but for a
technical difficulty. The rule on Mr. Bradley had been a rule to
show cause "why he should not be punished for contempt of this
court, by reason of said offensive conduct and language towards
one of its members, and relating to the official acts of the said
justice." It is not, we believe, denied that the commission of
an indictable offence by an attorney is such a misbehavior in his
office as will justify any court in disbarring him, nor do we understand the Supreme Court of the United States to intimate any
such doctrine; but the action of the court must be based on a
notice to the attorney that he is to be punished for misbehavior,
and where the notice speaks only of contempt, though it recite all
the facts of his actual conduct which is to be investigated, and
though, upon return of the rule, he file an answer covering the
whole controversy, and is heard in his defence upon all questions
of fact as well as law, yet the judgment of the court shall not
stand, because'it does not rest on a notice relating in terms to
misbehavor-a decision we think, with all respect, in which technical accuracy is maintained at the expense of substantial justice.
On January 26th, 1869, the Supreme Court of the District
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rescinded its order disbarring Mr. Bradley, Chief Justice CARTTER, in behalf of the court, saying that this was done in obedience to the supremacy of authority, and protesting, with considerable warmth, against the reasoning as well as the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the matter. He
then announced a further order that no attorney who had, or
should thereafter be suspended or disbarred by any of the courts
organized under the Act of 1863 (the Criminal Court of the District, &c.), for contempt of court, or professional misconduct,
should be allowed to practise in any of the other courts organized under that act.
On the calling of the first case, Mr. Bradley inquired whether
the order just made would, prevent him from practising in this
court, as he desired to be heard in the case just called. The
Chief Justice replied that the court would consider whether the
order affected Mr. Bradley or not, and would, in the mean time,
pass the case called. A few days afterwards Mr. Bradley presented a paper to the court purporting to be an apology, but
which the court, through WYLIE, J., in an opinion delivered February 1st, 1869, declined to consider as such. Here, at the present writing, the case rests.
The public attention drawn to this case, and the blundering or
mischievous perversions of the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States, by gossiping newspaper correspondents, have
induced us to make the foregoing careful statement from official
sources. With no acquaintance, prejudice, or favor in regard to
either party, we feel constrained to say that the facts, as they
stand, aie eminently discreditable to both.
That the conduct of Mr. Bradley, on August 10th, both in the
court-room and in the car, was a very flagrant contempt of court
at common law, is undeniable. Much allowance is to be made for
the original difficulty on July 2d, when both judge and counsel
wete wearied, and their tempers irritated by a session of two
months over a judicial farce that seemed interminable. Mr. Bradley's temper is bad enough at most times, it would appear, as it is
said by Judge WYLIE that he had already been fined for insulting, in open court, and charging another judge of this same court
with falsehood, but no infirmity of temper can be pleaded in palliation of a challenge to a judge for matters growing out of his
action while on the bench, and no challenge can be called hasty
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which is written on the 6th, not delivered until the 10th, and is
for an offence which occurred more than five weeks before. The
offence of striking a judge was high treason at common law, and even
in the great Act of Edward 3, defining and limiting the number
of treasons, it was still classed as the highest crime known to the
law to kill a judge in his place. No heavier blow can be struck
at the foundations of civil liberty and social order, than the introduction, however remotely, of the element of personal insecurity
among the considerations by which a judge shall regulate his judicial action. The delivery of a challenge to any one within the
District of Columbia is an indictable offence, under the laws of
the United States, and, morally considered, it was raised to a
heinous crime by the relations of the parties in this case. This
is a matter of the very highest professional concern, and while
we would not advocate anything that could in the least degree
lessen the proper independence of the bar, yet the perfect independence of the judiciary is a matter of far greater moment.
We cannot, therefore, avoid the expression of our regret that so
serious a matter should have been allowed to get lost in a maze
of side issues and small technicalities.
It is due to Mr. Bradley to say that, in his answer to the rule
in the Supreme Court of the District, he endeavors to explain
that the letter of August 6th was not a challenge, but we have
not been able to see the force of his explanation. That the letter
meant a challenge, no one, having the least knowledge of the
English language as used for the purposes of hostile encounters,
can entertain a moment's doubt. It was a challenge, and was
intended to be so understood, and it is puerile and evasive to call
it anything else.
While, however, we consider Mr. Bradley to have been most in
the wrong, yet the conduct of Judge FISHER is liable to severe
censure. Mr. Bradley's account of the first difficulty, on July
2d, puts the judge altogether in fault, and though we may fairly
assume that this account is colored by the passion of the quarrel,
yet it attributes language and behavior to the judge, in the presence of Mr. Phillips and other gentlemen, which, being uncontradicted, must be assumed as substantially true. A man who,
under any provocation of mere words, calls another "a scoundrel
and a coward," and dares him to "step out" to a pugilistic encounter, lacks, to speak mildly, the temper which qualifies him

